SSDT Decision: Patrick Ian Campbell

The latest SSDT decision covers a complaint made by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against Patrick Ian Campbell.

A Complaint was lodged by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against Patrick Ian Campbell, Solicitor, Glasgow that the Respondent may have been guilty of professional misconduct in respect of breaches of Rules B1.2, B1.3 and B1.4 of the Practice Rules 2011. The allegations related to a number of events which had occurred in the context of a previous friendship between the Respondent and the secondary complainer’s brother, AM. It was alleged that the Respondent had acted in breach of the Practice Rules in relation to the purchase of a property for AM’s late mother; in particular the arrangement of a mortgage and remortgage of said property and by retaining part of the sale free proceeds by the Respondent following the sale of the property on the death of AM’s mother. The Respondent disputed all allegations.

Following parole evidence and in consideration of all documents lodged as productions lodged in process, the Tribunal was invited to make no finding of professional misconduct in relation to two of the averments in the Complaint. The remaining three averments related to alleged breaches of Rules B1.2 which requires that a solicitor ‘must be trustworthy and act honestly at all time so that [their] personal integrity is beyond question. In particular [they] must not behave, whether in a professional capacity or otherwise, in a way which is fraudulent or deceitful’.

The Tribunal took the view that one of the remaining averments depended upon it being able to hold that a solicitor/client relationship existed in relation to that matter. It concluded that there was nothing in the evidence which supported that proposition; on the contrary the evidence suggested the contrary and, therefore, the Tribunal could not find as established that a solicitor/client relationship existed.

In relation to the remaining two averments, the Tribunal accepted the proposition that the duty of a solicitor to conduct him/herself with honesty and integrity can, in the appropriate circumstances, extend to his or her private life. However, before that could be considered, the Council must proved the facts of the averred conduct. Two accounts of events were presented by the parole evidence led at the Hearing and the Tribunal was unable to choose between those. It was impossible for the Tribunal to determine what the actual terms of any agreement between the parties were or the nature and extent of any indebtedness to the Respondent. However, based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal did accept that the Respondent had a genuine belief, reasonably held, regarding the source of the funds received from AM in relation to the purchase of the property detailed in the Complaint.

In all the circumstances, the Tribunal found the Respondent not guilty of professional misconduct. However, having regard to the different standard of proof applicable to unsatisfactory professional conduct, the Tribunal determined to remit the Complaint to the Council of the Law Society of Scotland in relation to the remaining averments in the Complaint to the extent that the Respondent may have allowed his integrity to be called not question and this may amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct.

The Tribunal exercised its discretion in the particular circumstances of this case in relation to expenses. It noted that that the Respondent acted reasonably, properly and in the exercise of its public duty to investigate the complex and involved set of circumstances which led to the Complaint. It noted that success by a Respondent was only one factor in determining an award of expenses and was not, of itself, decisive. The success of the Respondent here was limited in that the Complaint was ultimately remitted to the regulator for further consideration of unsatisfactory professional conduct. In all the circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that it was fair and appropriate to make no award of expenses to either party.

Publicity of the decision was ordered to include the name of the Respondent, the secondary complainer and AM. However, where individuals were mentioned during the course of evidence and that information could be potentially prejudicial to them, the Tribunal determined that they would not be named in the decision.